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Recent cognitive neuroscience research improved our understanding of 
where, when, how, and why language circuits emerge and activate in the hu-
man brain. Where: Regions crucial for very specific linguistic processes were 
delineated; phonetic features and fine semantic categories could be mapped 
onto specific sets of cortical areas. When: Brain correlates of phonological, 
syntactic and semantic processes were documented early on, suggesting 
language understanding in an instant (within 250 ms). How: New mechan-
istic network models mimicking structure and function of left-perisylvian 
language areas suggest that multimodal action-perception circuits — rather 
than separate modules for action and perception — carry the processing re-
sources for language use and understanding. Why language circuits emerge 
in specific areas, become active at specific early time points and are con-
nected in specific ways is best addressed in light of neuroscience principles 
governing neuronal activation, correlation learning, and, critically, partly 
predetermined structural information wired into connections between cor-
tical neurons and areas. 
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1. Introduction: Questions in Focus 
 
The aim of the neuroscience of language is to find the brain correlates of 
linguistic processes and representations. Correlates of linguistic representations 
are sought in neuronal structures, that is, nerve cell circuits, and correlates of 
linguistic processes are sought in patterns of neuronal activation. These aims 
have as yet not been reached. In many cases, conclusions are still at the level of 
‘areas’ ‘performing’ certain functions, a state not untypical for cognitive neuro-
science in general. However, such ‘arealogy’ can be understood as an inter-
mediate step on the journey towards neuroscientific explanation. To keep the 
ultimate destination in sight and in focus, it may be relevant to pause and check. 
                                                           
      I would like to thank Rachel Moseley, David Poeppel, Dietmar Zäfferer, and two anony-
mous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. This work was supported 
by the Medical Research Council (UK) (U1055.04.003.00001.01) and by the European Com-
munity under the ‘New and Emerging Science and Technologies’ Programme (NEST-2005-
PATH-HUM contract 043374, NESTCOM). 
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 Ultimately, the clarification of the brain correlates of a given cognitive re-
presentation R and process P implies answers to (at least) four critical questions: 
 
1. Where-question: Which brain parts, areas, and, eventually, neurons are 
active during, and are critical for, process P and the representation(s) R P 
relies on? 
2. When-question: At which point in time in the usage or understanding of 
language does process P occur; when is representation R activated and 
processed? 
3. How-question: Which neuronal circuit, which nerve cells linked in which 
way, is the brain basis for representation R; which spatiotemporal pattern 
of neuronal activation in this circuit does underpin the process P? 
4. Why-question: For what reason are R and P located in these specific brain 
parts and activated at these specific points in time, and why is R laid down 
in this specific neuronal circuit, P being expressed by these specific 
activation patterns? 
 
The present contribution will briefly review research addressing critical facets of 
these four questions. A focus will be on recent progress in mapping specific 
linguistic representations and processes onto brain space and time and a second 
focus will be on circuit structure and function. 
 
 
2. Where? Mapping Modules — Mapping Features and (Sub-)Categories 
 
2.1. Where-Question: Meaning 
 
Once, the name of the game in the cognitive neuroscience of language was to find 
a place in the brain for the major modules of linguistic processing. For example, 
when I wrote a paper for the journal Behavioural and Brain Sciences in 1999, a 
number of colleagues, well-known leaders in the field, commented on my review 
of the cortical basis of semantic processing, most of them by communicating that 
they had good empirical evidence to believe that a specific brain part is parti-
cularly relevant for word meaning processing (see comments, Pulvermüller 
1999). This ‘meaning centre’ as one may want to dub it, was placed in different 
parts of the left hemisphere, so that a large part of the left hemisphere was 
covered with semantic areas and reconciling the different views with each other 
appeared difficult. A more recent update of the literature shows a similar picture, 
especially in the temporal lobe, on which many studies focus. For example, 
Hickok & Poeppel (2007) put their ‘lexical interface’ assumed to connect phono-
logical and semantic representations in the middle-temporal cortex, Scott & 
Johnsrude (2003) suggest the anterior part of the superior-temporal gyrus as the 
meaning interface, and Patterson et al. (2007) put — based on a wealth of 
evidence from degenerative brain disease —that the temporal pole is the key area 
for semantic processing. Figure 1 illustrates the variability of positions. 
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Figure 1:  Different authors view different cortical sites as most important for binding the meaning 
of words to their form. The sketched proposals are based on recent publications (Epstein 1999, 
Posner & DiGirolamo 1999, Pulvermüller 1999, Salmelin et al. 1999, Skrandies 1999, Tranel & 
Damasio 1999, Scott & Johnsrude 2003, Hickok & Poeppel 2007, Hodges & Patterson 2007). This 
paper attempts at developing an integrated perspective. 
 
 The principal problem of the debate about such unitary meaning centers — 
or centers whose function it is to bind any meaning to any word/symbols — is 
the following: There is solid evidence for the importance of various cortical areas, 
at least in temporal and frontal lobes, in semantic processing and, by accumu-
lating more evidence in favor of the importance of any one area, one cannot, 
evidently, disprove the role of the other ones. This would only be the case if there 
was an exclusive either–or, that is, if only one cortical area was allowed to in-
clude a major meaning switchboard. Although semantic processing implies the 
integration of information from different sensory modalities, such integration can 
be computed locally between adjacent neurons as it can be carried by distributed 
populations of interacting neurons; hence again no need for a unitary semantic 
area. 
 A second major problem for a unitary meaning approach is semantic 
category-specificity: Lesions in many cases do not affect all word kinds (and 
symbol types) to the same degree. Dependent on where the lesion is situated, 
specific categories of knowledge are affected more or less. Significant differences 
between semantic kinds — such as animal vs. tool names — have been docu-
mented with lesions in frontal and temporal cortex (Warrington & McCarthy 
1983, Gainotti 2006) and processing differences between fine-grained semantic 
categories have even been reported in patients with semantic dementia (Pulver-
müller et al., in press). Here, the solution lies in the integration of general lexico-
semantic and category-specific semantic processes, as may be manifest in the 
interaction between a range of cortical areas (Patterson et al. 2007, Pulvermüller et 
al., in press). The precise location — or, perhaps better: distribution — of general 
and category-specific semantic circuits is one of the hottest topics in current neu-
roscience research. Figure 2 shows recent data indicating the approximate lo-
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cations of category-specific semantic circuits, as they can be inferred today from 
neuroimaging data, and contrasts them with brain activations generally seen for 
meaningful written word stimuli. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Brain activation patterns during passive word reading: Cortical areas activated by all 
words alike (left side) are contrasted with areas specifically activated by fine-grained semantic 
word categories (right side), action words related to the face (lick), arms (pick) or legs (kick) and 
visually-related form words (square) (modified from Pulvermüller, Kherif et al. 2009). Areas found 
active generally to all kinds of words may indicate the distribution of circuits for processing of 
general lexical-semantic information, whereas the widely distributed area sets found active for 
specific semantic types may index the distribution of category-specific semantic circuits. 
 
 So where is the progress? It still lies in the mapping of meaning on brain 
matter. Not just in the mapping of any kind of meaning to brain structure, or the 
delineation of a unitary meaning centre, global semantic binding site or the like, 
but in the brain mapping of sometimes fine grained semantic categories and sub-
types of knowledge. Most words indeed activate middle and inferior-temporal 
areas mainly involved in the processing of visual information about objects. This 
is not surprising because most words in languages like English are nouns refer-
ring to objects known through the visual modality. Animal and tool words, and 
similarly their related concepts, activate different inferior-temporal and middle-
temporal areas in both hemispheres (Damasio et al. 1996, Chao et al. 1999, Martin 
2007), and words referring to objects with characteristic form or color features 
(square vs. coal) elicit activity in overlapping but distinct areas in bursiform, pa-
rahippocampal and middle temporal gyri (Moscoso Del Prado et al. 2006, Pulver-
müller & Hauk 2006, Simmons et al. 2007). The inferior-temporal cortex — from 
pole to temporo-occipital junction — reflects a range of semantic distinctions and 
lesion in this region also appears to lead to specific degradation of particular 
semantic categories, to category specific semantic deficits (Warrington & Shallice 
1984, Damasio et al. 1996, Miceli et al. 2001, Neininger & Pulvermüller 2003). As 
one example, lesion of rostro-mesial temporal cortex in the left hemisphere — a 
subpart of which (anterior parahippocampal gyrus) was found active specifically 
during color word processing — impairs object color knowledge specifically 
(Miceli et al. 2001). 
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 The temporal lobes are not the only key areas for semantic processing. 
Words loaded with affective-emotional meaning can activate the amygdale, 
insular structures, and the posterior cingulated cortex (Straube et al. 2004, de 
Araujo et al. 2005). Odor words, as compared with matched control words, 
activate olfactory cortex along with limbic structures (Gonzalez et al. 2006), sound 
related words activate the superior temporal lobes more strongly than matched 
control words (Kiefer et al. 2008) and, critically, action-related verbs spark the 
motor and premotor cortex in such a specific manner that the body part related-
ness of the action indexed by the words becomes manifest in somatotopic acti-
vation in the motor strip (Pulvermüller et al. 2000, Hauk et al. 2004, Shtyrov et al. 
2004, Pulvermüller, Shtyrov & Ilmoniemi 2005). Words such as ‘pick’ and ‘kick’ 
would therefore specifically activate areas also active when subjects move their 
finger or foot. The overlap between areas active during motor performance and 
during congruous word processing is not complete; notably, normal motor per-
formance creates somatosensory input, leading to somatosensory postcentral 
activation which, when overlaid with motor cortex activation, shifts the centre of 
gravity of activation backward, towards the parietal lobe. However, the somato-
topic line-up of premotor activity reflecting aspects of action semantics could be 
replicated by a range of studies (Tettamanti et al. 2005, Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006, 
Tomasino et al. 2007, Kemmerer & Gonzalez-Castillo 2010, Boulenger et al. 2009, 
Raposo et al. 2009), with occasional failure to replicate activity in specific regions 
of interest (Postle et al. 2008). In one study, the semantic somatotopy could even 
be documented in abstract idiom processing (‘grasp the idea’, ‘kick the habit’; cf. 
Boulenger et al. 2009) consistent with an embodied, partly compositional view on 
abstract sentence meaning construction, to which lexical meaning contributes 
(Lakoff 1987, Barsalou 1999). 
 Importantly, these motor activations seem to index critical parts of the 
cortical semantic processor. Lesions in the motor system impair the processing of 
action-related words, especially that of action verbs (Damasio & Tranel 1993, 
Daniele et al. 1994, Neininger & Pulvermüller 2003, Tranel et al. 2003, Gainotti 
2008) and, in addition to these, of the related action concepts (Bak et al. 2001, Bak 
et al. 2006). In healthy individuals, magnetic stimulation below the motor thresh-
old to hand and foot areas in the left motor cortex could be shown to facilitate the 
processing of hand and foot related words specifically (Pulvermüller, Hauk et al. 
2005). These results document a causal role of the motor system in processing 
action concepts and words semantically related to actions. 
 What we have learned is, therefore, that the level of specificity of brain-
meaning mapping is much greater than previously thought. This is exciting from 
a linguistic perspective, as some semantic features of words seem to be apparent 
from the brain response they elicit. Of theoretical importance here is the fact that 
semantic areas could be predicted a priori on the basis of brain-theory, lending 
strong evidence for the underlying explanatory model (see section 5 below in the 
why-section of this article). Very specific action and perception features of refer-
ential semantic information linked to words can be mapped onto cortex. The 
search for the unitary meaning centre has, however, led to much disagreement, 
although it is possible that meaning integration at highly abstract levels draws 
upon only one area. The meaning centre seems to be best described as the union 
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of brain areas critically involved in category-specific processing and the bias to-
wards temporal cortex may relate to the habit of researchers to test object nouns 
and their related concepts. Note that important knowledge about most objects 
comes through the visual modality and the involvement of the inferiortemporal 
stream of object processing is therefore not surprising. Even for abstract words 
and sentences, different areas were found active by different researchers (e.g., 
Noppeney & Price 2004, Binder et al. 2005, Boulenger et al. 2009) raising the 
question whether category-specificity might hold even at abstract semantic levels 
(Pulvermüller & Hauk 2006). In one view, gradually more abstract semantic re-
presentations develop in progressively anterior areas in temporal and frontal 
cortex as a consequence of sensorimotor activity (Pulvermüller 2008). 
 An integrated view proposes category-specific semantic circuits whose 
precise distribution depends on meaning type (cf. Fig. 2). Areas most important 
for meaning emerge close to left-perisylvian language cortex — especially the 
inferior-frontal and superior-temporal gyri and sulci along with the underlying 
insula. All linguistic functions depend on this perisylvian region, whereas the 
category-specific meaning circuits extend throughout the cortex, the extrasylvian 
space. Action and object related meaning circuits draw upon motor and sensory 
areas and abstract semantic circuits develop in the vicinity of these sensorimotor 
sites, in anterior temporal and prefrontal cortex. There is differential laterality of 
linguistic and semantic processes and representations. Due to some property of 
the left perisylvian cortex (see the why-section 5), linguistic circuits are generally 
lateralized, although semantic circuits are spread out more symmetrically 
throughout both hemispheres (Fig. 2; Pulvermüller & Mohr 1996, Pulvermüller, 
Kherif et al. 2009). 
 Although the recent support for category-specific semantic circuits appears 
as a milestone in understanding the brain basis of meaning, it should not be 
ignored that some colleagues expressed criticisms. Caramazza’s group suggested 
that motor activity during the processing of action verbs may not be related to 
semantic processes but may instead be an epiphenomenon related to mental 
images being retrieved, if not entirely irrelevant ‘overflow’ activation (Oliveri et 
al. 2004). In face of more recent neuropsychological evidence supporting a crucial 
role of motor systems for processing words of specific action-related semantic 
categories (for review, see Pulvermüller & Fadiga 2010), a new proposal now ack-
nowledges a (possible) semantic function of the motor system, but complements 
it with an abstract symbol processor (Mahon & Caramazza 2008), a view similar 
to Patterson et al.’s (2007) suggestion that a ‘semantic hub’ — according to their 
data, in the temporal pole — complements widely distributed category-specific 
semantic circuits (see also Pulvermüller et al., in press). 
 A common misunderstanding about the role of sensorimotor circuits in 
semantic processing is that they provide the only source of meaning knowledge. 
However, this position does not appear very plausible. Combinatorial knowledge 
about words regularly occurring in sentence and discourse contexts implies 
semantic knowledge, for example about the most frequent color word the item 
‘strawberry’ would co-occur with (Landauer & Dumais 1997). Combinatorial 
word properties allow not only the classification of words into syntactic classes, 
they also lead to distinctions along semantic boundaries, separating types of ob-
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jects and types of actions (Pulvermüller & Knoblauch 2009). A mechanistic neuro-
biological approach captures the storage of the underlying word–word 
correlations by way of the very same mechanisms it also uses for storing word–
world correlations in neuronal links between sensorimotor and perisylvian 
language cortices (Pulvermüller 2010). Furthermore, correlation learning is not 
restricted to the single word level, but can, in principle, occur for larger con-
structions, especially if they are being used stereotypically in specific contexts 
(Goldberg 2003). Current neuroimaging results seem consistent with a contri-
bution of semantic representations of both constituent words and whole con-
structions when the meaning of abstract idiomatic sentences is being processed 
(Boulenger et al. 2009). 
 Some issues in the cortical localization of semantic processes are still open. 
The idea that access to movement knowledge tied to words is reflected in lateral 
temporal activation just anterior to a movement sensitive visual processing area 
(Martin et al. 1995) was recently questioned based on a lack of activation differen-
ces between nouns with more or less semantic relationship to movement (Bedny 
et al. 2008). While this finding argues against a role of middle temporal cortex in 
kinematic semantics, there is still solid evidence that the action-relatedness of 
word meaning is reflected in the activation of the left middle temporal area (MNI 
coordinates –62/–52/4; Hauk et al. 2008). The fact that the area activates more 
strongly to verbs than for nouns (e.g., Bedny et al. 2008, Hauk et al. 2008) is 
consistent with the action relatedness of most verbs, even verbs used to speak 
about so-called ‘internal states’. States such as thinking and feeling have 
characteristic behavioural expressions, thus intrinsically linking the semantics of 
the respective terms to action (Wittgenstein 1953). Therefore, any noun-verb 
difference is hopelessly confounded with semantic differences (Pulvermüller et al. 
1999). Furthermore, a recent study suggested that in the left middle temporal 
area, there are, side by side, different subareas that respond to words generally  
(–53/–49/–1), thus possibly contributing to general lexico-semantic processes, 
and to very specific semantic subcategories of action verbs (e.g., hand-related 
action verbs, –49/–51/–9) (Pulvermüller, Kherif et al. 2009). Such fine sub-
categorization may be a consequence of recurrent connections with the motor 
system, where semantic somatotopic activation is established. If the middle-
temporal activation to action-related words is due to links with the motor system 
(rather than to knowledge about moving visual input), it becomes explainable 
why such activation persists in visually deprived individuals (Mahon et al. 2009) 
who are not principally limited in their action repertoire and typically learn 
words, even visually-related ones, in action contexts (see Landau & Gleitman 
1985). These data are consistent with a differential role of temporal and frontal 
areas in semantic processing, although more research may indeed help clarifying 
the various linguistic roles of middle temporal gyrus activation in word and 
sentence processing. 
 
2.2. Where-Question: Speech Sounds 
 
Phonological processes are located in perisylvian cortex. In one view, speech 
analysis is attributed to systems in the anterior-lateral (antero-ventral processing 
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steam) and/or posterior part of the superior-temporal cortex (postero-dorsal 
stream, including planum temporale and lateral superior-temporal gyrus) 
(Rauschecker & Scott 2009). The planum temporale and other posterior superior-
temporal areas have long been viewed as critical for language perception and 
understanding, based on evidence from clinical language deficits (see, e.g., 
Geschwind 1970). Recent neuroimaging experiments showed that speech yields 
stronger activation in antero-ventral superior-temporal areas compared with 
matched noise patterns (Scott et al. 2000, Uppenkamp et al. 2006), and this evi-
dence is also consistent with data from macaques that anterior superior-temporal 
activity indexes species-specific calls (Romanski et al. 1999). Similar responses in 
posterior superior-temporal cortex to speech and other acoustic stimuli still allow 
for a role of this region in speech-language processing. This observation is 
compatible with a view of postero-dorsal areas, especially planum temporale but 
possibly also temporo-parietal junction, as a ‘computational hub’ for processing 
spectrotemporally rich acoustic patterns (Griffiths & Warren 2002). In addition to 
superior-temporal cortex, inferior-frontal cortex is active during listening to 
speech, as could be demonstrated using TMS (Fadiga et al. 2002), and inferior-
frontal activation even persists during passive exposure to speech, as could be 
shown using MEG (Pulvermüller 2003, Pulvermüller, Shtyrov & Ilmoniemi 2003). 
Critical inferior-frontal areas include posterior Broca’s (pars opercularis) and 
premotor cortex (Wilson et al. 2004). Similar to the posterior superior-temporal 
cortex, the motor system’s role is not confined to speech processing. The sounds 
of actions activate different sections of the fronto-central sensorimotor cortex in a 
very similar manner as linguistic sounds do (Hauk, Shtyrov & Pulvermüller 2006, 
Lahav et al. 2007). These results suggest that the computational hub for sound 
processing extends from posterior-temporal cortex to inferior-frontal and pre-
motor regions. Precisely timed spatio-temporal patterns of cortical activation 
spreading in this distributed cortical system may signify the processing of speech 
and other action sounds (Pulvermüller & Shtyrov 2009). 
 Similar to the semantic domain, recent advances in our knowledge about 
phonological representations and processes in the brain relates to specificity. Dif-
ferent areas in superior-temporal cortex were found active when subjects listened 
to different kinds of speech sounds (Diesch et al. 1996, Obleser et al. 2003, Obleser 
et al., 2006, Pulvermüller et al. 2006, Obleser et al. 2007). Typical examples of the 
phonemes [p] and [t] for example were mapped to adjacent areas in superior-
temporal gyrus, anterior to primary auditory cortex and Heschl’s gyrus. Inter-
estingly, a similar phonological mapping was evident in the motor system, where 
the production of [p] and [t] activated different precentral areas in a soma-totopic 
fashion. The articulatory mapping of phonemes to the motor system corres-
ponded to the localization of the articulators mainly involved in the production 
of the respective speech sounds — the lips for [p] and the tongue for [t] (Lotze et 
al. 2000, Hesselmann et al. 2004). 
 Notably, these different precentral motor/premotor areas were also found 
active during listening to speech. Listening to [t] activated the precentral focus 
also excited when producing a [t] or moving the tongue tip, and when hearing 
[p], a slightly dorsal area also active when producing this phoneme or when 
moving the lips lighted up (Pulvermüller et al. 2006). The critical role of these 
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motor systems in speech perception is evident from TMS work stimulating the 
motor regions of the lips and the tongue: Such stimulation biases the speech com-
prehension system in favor of congruent sounds. Therefore, when the tongue (or 
lips) area was stimulated, subjects tended to perceive [t] (or [p]) sounds more 
quickly, or even to misperceive [p] sounds as [t] (or the reverse) (D’Ausilio et al. 
2009). This observation demonstrates that motor systems critically contribute to 
the speech perception process. 
 In the phonological domain, progress seems two-fold. First, the perisylvian 
cortex, which is well-known to be critical for phonological processing and repre-
sentation, can be further subdivided according to phonological properties. Phon-
etic distinctive features, DFs, and speech sounds discriminated by these DFs can 
be mapped on different brain substrates in inferior-frontal and (antero-lateral) 
superior-temporal cortex. Second, the temporal and frontal neuronal ensembles 
appear to interact with each other and to be functionally interdependent in pho-
nological processing. The summarized data argue against proposals that seem to 
play down the role of frontal cortex in speech perception (see the how-section 4 
below, Hickok & Poeppel 2007, Lotto et al. 2009, and Scott et al. 2009). Note again 
that left inferior-frontal cortex activates in speech perception even when subjects 
try to ignore incoming speech sounds. Frontal activation therefore does not 
depend on attention being focused on speech (Pulvermüller et al. 2003, Pulver-
müller & Shtyrov 2006, 2009), although attention certainly exerts a modulatory 
function on language-elicited brain activity (Garagnani, Shtyrov & Pulvermüller 
2009, Shtyrov et al., in press). In the language domain, the posterior-dorsal vs. 
anterior-ventral stream debate seems, at present, not fully conclusive, as both 
parts of the superior-temporal cortex are apparently involved in speech proces-
sing and the absence of phoneme specificity in the posterior superior-temporal 
cortex appears as a null result without strong implications. Clear evidence exists 
for anterior-lateral superior-temporal activation discriminating phonemes from 
noise and phonemes between each other, but a contribution of posterior parts of 
superior-temporal cortex to phonological processing also receives support. 
 
2.3. Where-Question: Syntax 
 
It would seem exciting to delineate cortical maps for rules of syntax, similar to 
the mapping of semantic categories and that of phonetic DFs reviewed earlier in 
this section. However, such syntactic mapping has so far not been fully successful 
and major reasons for this lie in the tremendous difficulties the grammar domain 
creates for the experimental scientist. When comparing grammatical sentences to 
word strings with syntactic errors, the latter elicit stronger brain activation in left 
perisylvian cortex, especially in inferior-frontal and in superior-temporal cortex 
(e.g., Friederici et al. 2000, Indefrey et al. 2001, Pulvermüller & Shtyrov 2006, and 
Friederici 2009). When directly comparing sentences with different grammatical 
structure, for example active and passive, subject and object relative, and coordi-
nated and subordinated sentences, the grammatically more demanding sentences 
tended to elicit stronger activation; again some of the activation differences were 
located in left perisylvian cortex (Just et al. 1996, Caplan et al. 2000, Caplan et al. 
2008). Although these results suggest that processing of grammaticality and of 
F. Pulvermüller 
 
264 
the complexity of grammatical structure relates to inferior-frontal and superior-
temporal circuits, they do not unambiguously prove this. Ungrammatical sen-
tences are rare and therefore exceptional, whereas grammatical ones are normally 
more common, and among the grammatical ones, the sentences considered to be 
more complex (e.g., object relatives) are rarer than the ones considered to be sim-
pler (e.g., subject relatives). Heroic attempts have been made to control sequential 
probabilities while, at the same time, varying grammatical structure of well-
formed sentences (e.g., Bornkessel et al. 2002). However, as has been argued by 
linguists, such control has not been perfect (Kempen & Harbusch 2003) making it 
seem impossible to exclude the probability confound. 
 Whether syntax depends on discrete combinatorial rules or is best de-
scribed in terms of sequential probabilities constitutes a major debate in cognitive 
science (McClelland & Patterson 2002, Pinker & Ullman 2002). The linguistic po-
sition that rules of syntax and universal underlying principles govern grammar is 
in contrast with approaches using systematic probability mapping in neural net-
works or statistical procedures lacking any rule-like symbolic representations. 
These, too, are capable of modeling linguistic processes and have the additional 
advantage of explaining aspects of the learning of grammar (Rumelhart & 
McClelland 1987, Hare et al. 1995). That certain types of syntactic (and, likewise, 
phonological, semantic) structures a priori require a system of discrete combina-
torial rules and representations may, therefore, appear as a too strong statement, 
although this assumption figures as a firm corner stone of much cognitive theori-
zing in the second half of the 20th century. Whether discrete representations and 
especially rule-like entities exist turns out to be an empirical issue but also one 
addressable by brain theory and brain-based modeling (see how-section 4). The 
term ‘discrete’ — an expression with many facets that is used in different areas of 
cognitive science with rather different meanings — is used here to refer to a 
mechanism that either is being engaged in a given condition or is not, with little if 
any room for gradual intermediate steps. The sentence ‘Build a sentence from (at 
least) a noun and a verb’ describes a discrete combinatorial mechanism at an ab-
stract linguistic level. Can we expect that such discrete rule-like processes, rather 
than probability mapping, are effective at the neurobiological level? 
 Empirical testing of the existence of rule-like mechanisms is possible if pro-
bability mapping and rule-applicability dissociate. Examples are sentences that 
are grammatically correct but extremely rare in language use. These can be con-
trasted with grammatical sentences that are common, but also with ungramma-
tical strings that are rare to a similar degree as the rare grammatical items. As 
mentioned, ungrammatical strings elicit stronger brain activity than common 
grammatical sentences. As this neurophysiological difference is even observable 
if the same, identical recordings of spoken word strings are presented many 
times and even when subjects do not pay attention to the speech stimuli, some 
grammatical brain processes appear to be automatic (Shtyrov et al. 2003, Hasting 
& Kotz 2008, Pulvermüller et al. 2008). But, critically, would a rare gram-matical 
string produce a brain response indistinguishable from that of a common gram-
matical string, as a discrete all-or-nothing approach might suggest, or would the 
gradual probability differences between the strings be reflected in the neurophy-
siological brain response, as a probability mapping theory would predict? The 
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former was found: The brain response to rare ungrammatical strings was en-
hanced, that to grammatical strings was attenuated, regardless of the sequential 
probability of their constituent words (Pulvermüller & Assadollahi 2007). This 
result pattern is consistent with, and therefore supports, the rule theory. It should 
however be noted that a neural approach without discrete representations can be 
modified to fit these data if appropriate non-linearities are built into the network. 
 So, again, where is the progress? In the delineation of category-specific 
semantic circuits distributed over specific sets of cortical areas, in the mapping of 
phonetic features onto brain systems that encompass superior-temporal and 
inferior-frontal (including premotor) areas, and in new evidence in favor of 
discrete combinatorial rules brain-supported by left perisylvian circuits. 
 
 
3. When? The Rapid Time Course of Language Understanding 
 
A main stream view held that language understanding is a relatively late process 
(for review, see Barber & Kutas 2007 and Pulvermüller et al., 2009). Semantic pro-
cessing, along with lexical ones, were assumed to be first indexed by the N400 
component of the event-related brain potential and field. Syntactic processing 
was assumed to be indexed by an even later component, called P600. Both com-
ponents peak around half a second after information necessary for identifying 
critical stimulus words is present, suggesting that at least this amount of time 
elapses between presence of a word in the input (say, ‘bear’ in a warning con-
text), and the initiation of an appropriate response (for example, running away). 
Such long-delay comprehension systems may have advantages under certain 
conditions, however, from a Darwinian perspective, a faster system minimizing 
the comprehension latency would certainly have constituted an evolutionary ad-
vantage. 
 In fact, some research indicated early brain reflections of syntactic and se-
mantic processing. In the semantic domain, the meaning of action words becomes 
manifest in somatotopic motor systems activation already 100–250 ms after avail-
ability of information about the identity of spoken (Shtyrov et al. 2004, Pulver-
müller, Shtyrov & Ilmoniemi 2005) or written (Pulvermüller et al. 2000, Hauk & 
Pulvermüller 2004) stimulus words. At the same latencies, the neuro-physio-
logical responses dissociated between word kinds semantically linked to visual 
information — for example, between color- and form-related words (Sim & 
Kiefer 2005, Moscoso Del Prado Martin et al. 2006, Kiefer et al. 2007). Likewise, 
large word categories differing in both their grammatical function and their 
semantic characteristics — for example, grammatical function words and referen-
tial content words, or object nouns and action verbs — dissociate neurophysio-
logically within 250 ms (for an overview, see Pulvermüller, Shtyrov & Hauk 
2009). A range of other psychological and linguistic factors, including frequency 
of occurrence of words and their parts and general semantic properties, could 
also be mapped onto the first 250 ms, in this case calculated from the onset of 
written word presentation. The early effects (<250 ms) seem to be more variable 
and less robust than the later (~500 ms) ones (Barber & Kutas 2007). Importantly, 
they do depend strongly on stimulus properties, especially the length and lumi-
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nance of written words and the loudness of spoken works and the point in time 
when they can first be recognized with confidence (Pulvermüller & Shtyrov 
2006). Early and late indexes of semantics may reflect different processes in the 
analysis of word meaning, automatic semantic access and semantic re-analysis 
(Pulvermüller, Shtyrov & Hauk 2009). 
 Syntactic processing is long known to have an early brain correlate. 
Violations of phrase structure rules were found to lead to enhanced negativities 
already at 100–250 ms, in the early left-anterior negativity (Neville et al. 1991, 
Friederici et al. 1993). More recently, similar early violation responses, in the 
syntactic mismatch negativity component, have been reported to violations of the 
rules of phrase structure and agreement (Shtyrov et al. 2003, Hasting & Kotz 2008, 
Pulvermüller et al. 2008). It is these early responses that are automatic (see where-
section above), whereas the late ones (P600) depend on attention to stimulus sen-
tences: Brain correlate of syntactic mismatches in the ‘syntactic mismatch negati-
vity’ can be recorded in subjects who do not attend to speech that includes gram-
matical violations; the early responses (up to 150 ms) remain unchanged even if 
subjects are heavily distracted from speech and syntax by a continuously applied 
attentional streaming task. This proves that at least some early mechanism of the 
brain’s grammar machinery operates automatically or, as once claimed, ‘like a 
reflex’ (Fodor 1983). 
 In sum, syntactic and semantic processes are reflected by relatively late 
brain responses that depend on task and attention to stimuli. In addition, early,   
<250 ms, brain indexes of syntax and semantics also exist and these seem to be 
less dependent on attention being paid to stimuli, in some cases entirely 
attention-independent. For phonological and pragmatic processes, there are also 
reports about early as well as late brain correlates. For example, an early brain 
correlate of phoneme processing is present in the mismatch negativity (Dehaene-
Lambertz 1997, Näätänen et al. 1997) and early indexes of pragmatic deviance 
have been reported in studies of text processing (Brown et al. 2000). Phonological 
expectancy violations (Rugg 1984, Praamstra & Stegeman 1993) as well as prag-
matic and discourse-related ones (van Berkum, Brown et al. 2003, van Berkum, 
Zwitserlood et al. 2003) also were found to produce late effects at ~400 ms. An 
interpretation of early vs. late effects is possible along the lines of dual-stage 
models, such as Friederici’s (2002) influential model. The early process would ac-
cordingly be an automatic comprehension or matching process, whereas the late 
process could either imply an in depth extension of the process or a revision and 
re-analysis. Friederici proposes this for the syntactic domain but, in light of the 
early and late components indexing essentially all kinds of psycholinguistic infor-
mation, the same general concept can be applied to other psycholinguistic levels 
of processing, too. 
 A different and complementary approach relates the latency of cognitive 
neurophysiological responses to stimulus properties, especially the variability of 
physical, form-related properties. Larger variance of these variables, including 
word length and acoustic properties of spoken materials, increases the variance 
of brain responses especially at early latencies. Therefore, such variance may 
mask early brain responses reflecting cognitive and psycholinguistic processing. 
Late responses survive in attention-demanding tasks because they are large, 
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long-lasting and widespread. Evidence for this view has recently been reported. 
Minimal variability of physical and psycholinguistic stimulus properties is criti-
cal for obtaining early effects in lexical, semantic, and syntactic processing (Assa-
dollahi & Pulvermüller 2001, Pulvermüller & Shtyrov 2006, Penolazzi et al. 2007). 
 Important time aspects are immanent to the orchestration of cortical 
sources. It has been suggested that the brain uses a precise temporal code to 
transmit information at the neural level. Serial models had put that phonological, 
lexical, syntactic, and semantic processes follow each other in a given order 
(which varied between models). However, the early near-simultaneous neuro-
physiological responses mentioned above suggest that these processes run 
largely in parallel with little if any offset between them (Hauk, Davis et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, small timing differences have been reported between subtypes of 
semantic processes. Leg-related action words tend to spark the leg region slightly 
later than words with arm or face reference activate their corresponding inferior 
motor areas (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov & Ilmoniemi 2005). Here, timing differences 
seem to indicate semantic differences. A recent study comparing the timing of left 
superior-temporal, lateral-central, and inferior-frontal area activations found 
delays between regions that depended on stimulus type. Phoneme sequences and 
word stimuli led to a delayed activation of inferior-frontal cortex, 10–25 ms after 
superior-temporal cortex, whereas noise stimuli failed to elicit a comparable 
activation delay between regions (Pulvermüller & Shtyrov 2009). Therefore, the 
delay between regions of interest activations coded the phonological status of 
acoustic stimuli. 
 Interestingly, reliable time delays only emerged between superior-temporal 
and inferior-frontal cortex. The latero-central region including motor and pre-
motor areas activated together with superior-temporal cortex. This suggests that 
the postero-dorsal stream activates more quickly than the antero-ventral stream, 
but that the latter conveys important information about the phonological status 
of sounds. 
 In summary, early near-simultaneous brain responses (latency <250 ms) 
index different facets of the comprehension process, including word form 
analysis, semantic access along with syntactic and semantic context integration, 
suggesting near-simultaneity (or short-delay seriality) in psycholinguistic infor-
mation access. The short delays are potentially accountable in terms of cortical 
conduction times (Pulvermüller et al. 2009). 
 
 
4. How? Brain-Based Models of Circuits, Their Activations and Delays 
 
A general conclusion suggested by much recent research is that action and per-
ception are not stand alone processes but are functionally interwoven at the mecha-
nistic level of neuronal circuits. This insight has gained momentum in basic and 
cognitive neuroscience, including research into perception and action in animals 
and humans (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004, Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010), visuo-
motor integration (Bruce & Goldberg 1985), and language processing (Pulver- 
müller 2005, Pulvermüller & Fadiga 2010). Consistent with such interdepen-
dence are both behavioural and neurofunctional observations. Action does not 
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solely relate to motor systems activation, but likewise draws on perceptual mech-
anisms, as in the co-activation of superior-temporal cortex during silent speaking 
(Paus et al. 1996). The Lee effect of delayed auditory feedback on speech output 
(Lee 1950) demonstrates a profound automatic influence of acoustic-phonetic 
processes on ongoing speech output, a conclusion strengthened by the neuro-
functional studies demonstrating motor systems activation by perception of move-
ments and speech (Fadiga et al. 1995, Fadiga et al. 2002). Speech perception does 
not just ‘take place’ in the superior-temporal cortex alone. The motor system is 
co-activated and assists, modulates, and sharpens the speech perception process. 
 One may describe this interaction in classic terms. Earlier proposals had 
suggested that perception is, in part, an active process by which action hypo-
theses play a role (see also Bever & Poeppel, this volume). Accordingly, ‘bottom-
up’ perceptual analysis triggers a hypothesis about the input, followed by an 
action-related ‘top-down’ synthesis, the product of which is finally compared 
with and eventually matched to further input information, thus confirming or 
rejecting the perceptual hypothesis (Halle & Stevens 1959, 1962). When recogni-
zing a naturally spoken syllable such as [pIk], already the vowel includes co-
articulatory information about the subsequent consonant, which may give rise to 
the — still premature — hypothesis that [pIk] is coming up (Warren & Marslen-
Wilson 1987, 1988). This hypothesis can be compared with further input — 
especially the plosion of the final [k] — until a match is reached. In the syntactic 
domain, a noun may generate the hypothesis that a sentence including a verb 
will emerge, and the N–V hypothesis can be compared, and eventually matched, 
with the input, a process compatible with the state sequence of a left-corner 
parser (Aho et al. 1987). This hypothesis generation and testing, as suggested by 
classic cognitive theories of phonological analysis-by-synthesis and left-corner 
parsing may capture aspects of the functional significance of the co-activation of 
frontal and posterior areas in cognitive processing in general and in language 
processing in particular. 
 While it is possible that similar descriptions in terms of perception-by-
synthesis may capture aspects of the real mechanisms, they are not very precise 
and certainly not spelt out in terms of neurons. A vague formulation of action-
perception interaction still leaves open questions including the following: How 
many concurrent hypotheses can be entertained at a time, and how many simul-
taneous top down predictions are allowed? Can analysis, hypothesizing, and 
synthesis, and matching run in parallel, with constant functional interaction bet-
ween them, or are they serial modular processes? Are controlled conscious 
intentional decisions required in the literal sense or can the ‘decision’ process also 
be construed as automatic? There are many degrees of freedom here. One kind of 
description — in terms of ‘hypotheses’ and ‘synthesis’ — suggests attention 
demanding modular processes that are being entertained sequentially, one by 
one. However, much psycholinguistic research supports parallel processing of 
competing hypotheses. Gating experiments for example indicate that several 
competing hypotheses about possibly upcoming words are built, maintained and 
tested in parallel until one of them ‘wins’, a position immanent to models in the 
tradition of the cohort theory (Marslen-Wilson 1987, Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson 
2002). The motor theory of speech perception, as one variant of an analysis-by-
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synthesis approach, made the additional assumption that speech perception as a 
modular process is separate from other acoustic perceptual processes, a view dif-
ficult to reconcile with current neuroimaging data showing that the same cortical 
foci are active when producing articulator movements and speech sounds 
(Pulvermüller et al. 2006). An obvious deficit of analysis-by-synthesis approaches 
is the lack of a time scale. Perceptual analysis, hypothesis generation, and action 
synthesis and matching could each last for seconds or take place near-
simultaneously. This general approach seems to be in need of additional detail to 
provide mechanistic explanations. 
 In my view, progress in clarifying the mechanisms underlying action-
perception interaction requires brain theory. Correlational information between 
the speech signal and articulatory gestures together with neuroanatomical and 
neurophysiological knowledge and principles provide a firm basis for postu-
lating action-perception circuits that (i) span inferior-frontal and superior-
temporal areas, (ii) become active near-simultaneously with minimal inter-area 
delays determined by axonal conduction times, (iii) play a role in speech 
production and in speech perception too, and (iv) provide continuous facilitatory 
interaction between the inferior-frontal and superior-temporal parts of each 
circuit while at the same time (v) competing with other action-perception circuits. 
 The mechanisms of and processes in such circuits can be explored in 
computational work using networks with neuroanatomically realistic structure 
and plausible neurophysiological function (see Fig. 3; Wennekers et al. 2006, 
Garagnani et al. 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Areas of the left-perisylvian language cortex, connections between them and 
implementation in the model of the language cortex (MLC; Garagnani et al. 2007, Garagnani et al. 
2008). Explicit neuromechanistic models grounded in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology can be 
used to simulate language processes in the brain and, eventually, to explain them. The areas shown 
on the brain diagram at the top and implemented in the MLC at the bottom are: Primary auditory 
cortex (A1), auditory belt (AB), auditory parabelt (PB), inferior prefrontal (PF), premotor (PM) 
and primary motor (M1) cortex. AB and PB together are sometimes called the ‘auditory language 
area’ or ‘Wernicke’s region’ and AB and PB the ‘motor language area’ or ‘Broca’s region’. 
F. Pulvermüller 
 
270 
These simulations show that during the recognition of a word such as [pIk] the 
following processes take place: 
 
1. The auditory signal leads to stimulation of neuronal populations in 
superior-temporal cortex where activity spreads from primary auditory 
cortex, A1, to the surrounding auditory belt, AB, and parabelt, PB. This 
activation is mainly carried by the best-stimulated circuit(s), the target 
word, but partly also by its cohort members’ and neighbors’ circuits ([pIp], 
[kIk]). At the cognitive level, one may say that the system entertains several 
perceptual hypotheses.  
2. With a slight delay (realistically, 10–25 ms), activation also spreads to 
inferior-frontal cortex, to prefrontal, PF, premotor, PM, and (to a lesser 
degree) primary motor, M1, areas. This activation spreading is mainly 
carried by the phonological and lexical circuits best stimulated, which 
impose a fixed spatio-temporal pattern of activation. The advantage of such 
action links may lie in the separation of circuits whose perceptual parts 
overlap to a large degree. The syllable-initial phonemes [p] and [t] sound 
similar, but are based on motor programs for different articulators con-
trolled by motor neurons at different locations in the motor system, in PM 
and M1, which are ~2 cm apart (Pulvermüller et al. 2006). Although their 
perceptual circuits (in A1, AB, and PB) overlap substantially, their action 
circuits (in PM, M1) do not to a similar degree. If circuits overlap, they can-
not easily inhibit each other, a requirement for a decision and functional 
distinction between them. Therefore, the separation of circuit parts in the 
motor system enables between-circuit inhibition, and thus facilitates a discri-
mination and decision process between partly activated overlapping circuits. 
3. Activation from the most active motor circuit is fed back to superior-
temporal circuit parts. The superior-temporal part of the circuit organizing 
the critical word [pIk] receives strong feedback activation from the action 
system, whereas those of competitor words receive comparably little (due 
to the competition process in the action system). The word-related cell 
assembly fully ignites; the correct word is being recognized. At the cogni-
tive level, a perceptual decision has emerged. 
 
Critically, as more and more auditory activation and information comes in, the 
activity hierarchy among the word-related cell assemblies shifts in favor of one; 
competitors are suppressed by an inhibition mechanism. Processes 1–3 involve a 
range of perceptual, phonological and lexical circuits, which accumulate 
excitation and compete simultaneously until, ultimately, activation entropy in the 
system decreases and one circuit ignites. Many factors, including noise, circuit 
overlap (cf. lexical neighborhood structure) and connection strength (cf. word 
frequency) — can influence the temporal dynamics of the processes. Although, 
the physiological word recognition process, including activation spreading, com-
petition and ignition, may normally be very rapid (200–250 ms, see when-section, 
Hauk, Davis et al. 2006, Pulvermüller & Shtyrov 2006, and Pulvermüller, Shtyrov 
& Hauk 2009), a range of factors may lead to a delay in word recognition. Under 
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high entropy conditions (e.g., high noise, very strong neighbors) these processes 
may be delayed both in superior-temporal and inferior-frontal areas. Note, how-
ever, that the inhibition mechanism which, as argued above, is most efficient in 
inferior-frontal cortex, implies entropy reduction with time. Processes of gener-
ating and deciding between hypotheses analogous to the ones spelt out here in 
detail for speech perception are envisaged to underpin meaning comprehension 
and speech production as well. 
 The neurobiological basis of cognitive processes such as perceptual hypo-
thesis generation and decision can be traced with explicit neurocomputational 
studies (Wennekers et al. 2006, Garagnani et al. 2008, Garagnani, Wennekers & 
Pulvermüller 2009). As mentioned, these models build strong functional links 
between frontal action circuits and posterior perception circuits. Therefore, a 
lesion in the action part of the distributed circuits does not only impair actions, it 
may also impact on perception and understanding, and, vice versa, lesions in the 
perceptual network part can reduce motor output functions in addition to 
causing perceptual deficits (Pulvermüller & Fadiga 2010). This is consistent, for 
example, with well-known reports about speech perception deficits and abnor-
malities in patients with different types of aphasia (Basso et al. 1977, Blumstein et 
al. 1994). Under taxing conditions, aphasic patients with Broca aphasia, which 
typically relates to frontal lesion, have difficulty understanding single words 
(Moineau et al. 2005) and even under optimal perceptual conditions, compre-
hension is delayed and activation of phonological cohort members reduced 
(Utman et al. 2001, Yee et al. 2008). Inferior-frontal lesion has a similar effect on 
gesture discrimination (Pazzaglia et al. 2008). Some colleagues chose to ignore 
these and similar reports of inferior-frontal lesions and their related speech 
perception deficits, or play them down as ‘not dramatic’ (Hickok 2009, Bever & 
Poeppel, this volume; see Pulvermüller & Fadiga 2010 for a review of this dis-
cussion). In this context, the reader should also be reminded of the TMS evidence 
showing that precentral stimulation alters speech perception (see where-section, 
sounds, and, for example, D’Ausilio et al. 2009), and of the fact that neural 
degeneration in the motor cortex and inferior part of the frontal lobes leads to 
language and conceptual deficits, especially for words and concepts related to 
actions (see where-section 2.1 and, for example, Bak et al. 2001). 
 The instant flow of activation from superior-temporal ‘perceptual’ neurons 
to inferior-frontal ‘action’ neurons bound together in a distributed action-
perception circuit is an automatic process under standard conditions (case A: 
unambiguous input, good signal-to-noise ratio), but is modified under specific 
circumstances. In case competitor circuits are stimulated by a perceptually ambi-
guous stimulus ([#Ik] with # in between [p] and [t]), two lexical circuits compete 
and, for reaching a decision, the inferior-frontal activations and competitive 
mechanisms are of greatest importance. Competitor circuit activations, the associ-
ated increased entropy of the activation landscape and subsequent regulation 
take time so that the ignition of the winning (target) circuit will be delayed (case 
B). In the worst case (C), the wrong action-perception circuit may ignite first, 
further perceptual evidence arriving later builds up activation in the ‘correct’ 
circuit so that its ignition is much delayed and a revision of the perception 
process results. In all three cases, straight perception (A), high entropy perception 
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(B), and corrected perception (C), inferior-frontal ‘action circuits’ may be critical 
in the perception process, although the inferior-frontal activation may differ as a 
function of effort and attention necessary. Consistent with this view, a recent 
experiment on attention modulation in speech perception showed a modulatory 
effect of attention on inferior-frontal activation, which was stronger than the one 
seen in superior-temporal cortex (Shtyrov et al., in press). In order to allow for 
similarly specific predictions, an action-perception approach — or likewise 
analysis-by-synthesis approach — needed to be stated in terms of a mechanistic 
brain-based circuit model. 
 Cognitive scientists entertain a major debate about the existence of symbol 
representations that behave in a discrete manner, becoming active in an all-or-
none fashion rather than gradually. Linguistic and symbolic linguistic theories 
build on such discrete representations, whereas many neural processing ap-
proaches postulate distributed representations and processes that are gradual. In 
this case, the gradual distance of an activation pattern to the closest perceptual 
target vector determines the percept. Using networks fashioned according to the 
neuroanatomical structure and connection pattern of the left-perisylvian lang-
uage cortex along with neurophysiologically realistic synaptic learning, we found 
neuronal correlates of discrete symbols in distributed action-perception circuits. 
These circuits indeed behave in a discrete fashion, showing an explosion-like 
ignition process to above-threshold stimulation. The circuits overlap to a degree 
and a specific type of realistic learning rule has a network effect of reducing this 
overlap (Garagnani, Wennekers & Pulvermüller 2009). The finding that distri-
buted and discrete circuits develop in realistic neuroscience grounded networks 
may entail a better understanding of the mechanisms of symbol processing.  
 
 
5. Why: From Brain Mechanisms to Explanation 
 
A range of why questions target the causal origin of brain mechanisms of lang-
uage as we can infer them: Why are phonetic distinctive features mapped on spe-
cific loci of cortex? Why in the intact language-competent brain do acoustic pho-
nological representations in superior-temporal cortex functionally depend on and 
interact with articulatory-phonological representations in inferior-frontal cortex? 
Why do phonological circuits link together into lexical ones, and why do these 
perisylvian cell assemblies underpinning spoken words link up with semantic 
networks elsewhere in the brain? Why do these semantic networks encompass so 
many other sets of areas, that color word connect to parahippocampal and fusi-
form, arm action words to precentral, and odor words to pyri-form cortex? Why 
do certain neuronal networks support the emergence of discrete neuronal circuits 
for linguistic representations? Why do some networks — dependent on their 
internal structure, function and learning algorithms — either support the build-
up of discrete combinatorial representations with a function similar to syntactic 
rules or suggest that such rule-like representations do not exist? Exciting 
questions like these can be added almost ad infinitum, but it is difficult to say how 
far we actually are from an ultimate answer to them. Let me make an attempt to 
outline components of such an explanatory answer using two examples. 
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 There are known properties of the brain and of brain function that can form 
a basis of neuroscientific explanation. Our brain’s most important structure for 
cognition, the cortex, is, structurally and functionally, an associative memory 
(Braitenberg & Schüz 1998). Its neurons are linked by way of their synapses and 
links strengthen depending on their use, or correlation of activation (Tsumoto 
1992). The cortex is not, however, a tabula rasa learning structure. It is equipped 
with a wealth of information. Some of this information is manifest structurally, in 
the anatomy of the cortex, in the structure and microstructure of areas, connect-
ions between areas and even the microstructure of neurons and their biochemical 
properties. 
 Some of the explanations and answers to ‘Why X?’ — questions may 
therefore recur to such established knowledge. As one example, explanations can 
be of the form ‘Because X is a necessary consequence of functional correlation of 
neuronal processes a and b and the structural connections between the neuronal 
structures (neurons, neuronal assemblies) A and B’. Due to such functional corre-
lation of structurally connected units acoustic and articulatory phonological 
representations connect with each other to form action-perception circuits for 
integration of phonological information in speech perception and production. 
Statistical learning of co-occurrence patterns of phonemes in words and mor-
phemes accounts for the formation of lexical representations (Saffran et al. 1996, 
Pelucchi et al. 2009), which are realized as neuronal ensembles distributed over 
perisylvian cortex. Correlation between word form and activity in sensory and 
motor systems of the brain also explains the binding between sign and its 
referential meaning, given the relevant connections necessary for such learning 
are available in the first place. Information about the referents is available in 
different brain systems — motor, visual, auditory, olfactory, etc. — for different 
kinds of words, therefore the differential distribution of category-specific seman-
tic circuits results. As soon as a stock of signs with referential meaning is avail-
able, indirect, contextual semantic learning is possible due to the correlation of 
new word forms with familiar ones for which referential semantic information is 
already available. Co-activation of the new words’ neuronal circuits with seman-
tic circuits bound to familiar words, which appear in the context of the new ones, 
leads to the binding of semantic neurons to the new words’ circuits, thus offering 
a neuronal basis for in-context semantic learning (Pulvermüller 2002). 
 An important component of this account is correlation learning and 
consequent binding (i) between action and perception circuits in phonological 
learning, (ii) between phonological circuits in lexical learning, (iii) between word 
form and referential action and perception circuits in semantic learning, and (iv) 
between new word form circuits and previously established semantic circuits 
that are co-activated in contextual semantic learning. Note again that such learn-
ing is only possible if the necessary neuronal substrates and connections storing 
the critical correlations are available in the first place. These substrates and con-
nections are determined to a great extent by the genetic code (Vargha-Khadem 
2005, Fisher & Scharff 2009), although some influence of neuronal activity on the 
formation of connections cannot be denied (Rauschecker & Singer 1979, Hubel 
1988, Engert & Bonhoeffer 1999, Nagerl et al. 2007). 
 For some time, modern cognitive scientists were slightly skeptical regard-
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ing a major role of correlation-driven learning in cognition. This is understand-
able, because, historically, modern cognitive science set itself apart from behavi-
orism, which had once emphasized the role of some forms of associative learning 
in a tabula rasa system called a ‘black box’. Evidently, such an approach is unable 
to explain area-specific activation patterns in the grey matter or the functional 
relevance of specific white matter tracts and thus cannot succeed in the neuro-
biological explanation of cognitive functions. However, a dismissal of the rele-
vance of correlation learning at the neurobiological level would seem an undue 
over-reaction to behaviorism. The empirical support for learning based on correl-
ation of neuronal activity seems too strong and its implications for brain lang-
uage theory too clear (see Pulvermüller 1999). Importantly, and in sharp contrast 
with behaviorist approaches, the effect of correlation of neuronal activation needs 
to be considered in the context of existing neuroanatomical connectivity. 
 Neuroanatomical connections of linguistic importance have been docu-
mented in the healthy undeprived human brain. In particular, there are multiple 
connections between superior- and middle-temporal gyrus and inferior-frontal 
prefrontal, premotor, and opercular cortex via the capsula extrema (Saur et al. 
2008, Petrides & Pandya 2009) and further inferior-frontal to superior-temporal 
connections also including inferior-prefrontal and superior-temporal areas via 
the fasciculus arcuatus (Glasser & Rilling 2008, Petrides & Pandya 2009). Some of 
these latter connections seem to stop over in the inferior-parietal cortex and in 
general the parietal lobe seems strongly linked into the fronto-temporal network 
(Catani et al. 2005). Some fronto-temporal connections were already evident in 
non-human primates (Pandya & Yeterian 1985, Petrides & Pandya 2009), 
although direct comparison showed that especially the arcuate fascicle is most 
strongly developed in humans (Rilling et al. 2008). This congruency and gradual 
difference suggests a pathway by which the genetic code did influence the emer-
gence of human language in evolution. Strong direct fronto-temporal connections 
enabled the build-up of a large numbers of action-perception circuits for phono-
logical and lexical processing in humans. As the rich fronto-temporal connections 
could for the first time support a great variety of fronto-temporal action-
perception circuits, this proposal suggests a neurobiological explanation for the 
large vocabularies of human languages. Human languages include large vocabu-
laries of 10,000s of spoken words (Pinker 1994), whereas our closest relatives, 
great apes, use only ~20–40 different signs (Pika et al. 2003, Tomasello & Call 
2007), and even under massive training show a limit of ~200–300 symbols 
(Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1985). As the documented fronto-temporal links seem to 
be mainly left-lateralized (Catani et al. 2005), the neuroanatomical-neuro-functi-
onal approach also provides a natural explanation for why language is lateralized 
to the left hemisphere in most human subjects. Because the left hemisphere 
houses most of the fronto-temporal connections in perisylvian language cortex 
(Catani et al. 2005), action-perception correlation can best be stored there, so that 
the phonological and lexical action-perception circuits are lateralized to the left. 
 Whether aspects of syntax can also be learned in an associative manner, 
given some neuroanatomically manifest genetic information is available, remains 
a topic of debate. Investigations into statistical language learning demonstrate 
that much syntactic information is immanent to the correlations and conditional 
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probabilities between words in sentences; this information can be used, for 
example, to automatically classify words into lexical classes (Briscoe & Carroll 
1997, Lin 1998). Neural network research demonstrates that such combinatorial 
information can also be extracted with neuron-like devices and neuro-
functionally-inspired algorithms (Elman 1990, Honkela et al. 1995, Christiansen & 
Chater 1999, Hanson & Negishi 2002). A dispute can still occur about the degree 
to which the neural processes and structures can be likened to constructs postu-
lated by linguists and cognitive scientists. In one view, neural networks 
processing syntactic information are probability mapping devices entirely dis-
similar to the rule systems proposed in linguistics (Elman et al. 1996, McClelland 
& Patterson 2003). 
 We recently explored sequence probability mapping in neuronal networks 
incorporating important features of cortical connectivity frequently omitted by 
neural approaches (Knoblauch & Pulvermüller 2005, Pulvermüller & Knoblauch 
2009). In these networks, we found formation of aggregates of neurons that, after 
learning, responded in a discrete ‘all-or-nothing’ fashion to similar contexts. 
These neuronal assemblies were primed by a range of past contexts and, in turn, 
primed a range of possible successor contexts. As an example, a range of different 
nouns primed the neuronal aggregate, which, in turn, activated a range of verbs. 
The neuronal aggregates were connected to word representations in a discrete 
fashion, i.e. either strongly or very weakly. Such neuronal grouping is similar to 
the discrete grouping of words into lexical categories (noun or verb) and the 
linkage of such discrete combinatorial categories bears similarity to syntactic 
rules linking together lexical and larger syntactic categories in a sequential 
fashion. A rule such as ‘S → N V’ or ‘S → NP VP’ (along with other syntactic and 
lexicon rules) would equally connect a wide range of utterances it covers. Inter-
estingly, the combinatorial neuronal assemblies connect constituent pairs not pre-
viously learned together, thus documenting a degree of generalization along with 
functional discreteness. 
 Features of the grammar network setting it apart from other models used in 
cognitive science to approach aspects of the serial-order problem include the 
following: Massive auto-associative connections within an area, neurons sensitive 
to sequential activation of input units, sparse activation and input coding, Hebb-
type unsupervised learning, and activity control mechanisms using inhibition. 
These features, all of which also characterize the cortex, may contribute to the 
formation of combinatorial neuronal assemblies and may be important for under-
standing why brains build rules — assuming, as some evidence suggests, that 
they indeed do so. The combinatorial neuronal assemblies may play a crucial role 
in the neuronal grammar machinery, although additional mechanisms are necessary 
for such a device to process a range of sentence structures (Pulvermüller 2003). 
 In the why-section of this paper, some still incomplete explanation attempts 
were explored, covering the laterality of language functions and its relationship 
to cortical connectivity, the structural and functional basis of action-perception 
circuits in phonological, lexical and semantic processing, and the formation of 
functionally discrete circuits, especially in the combinatorial domain, and the still 
tentative relationship of such discrete circuit emergence to network structure. 
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6. Linguistic Summary and Synopsis 
 
From the standpoint of linguistic theory, what is gained from recent neuroscience 
research? In the semantic domain, we have learned that there is a very real sense 
in which semantic categories exist. Meaning is not the mental representation of 
objects, relevant to it are action aspects as well. At the semantic level, language is 
‘woven into action’ and this insight from the analytical theory of language is 
backed by brain research. Motor and sensory systems activation demonstrates 
semantic categories along brain dimensions. Additional areas, in the vicinity of 
sensorimotor domains, may play a role in abstract semantic processing and in 
general meaning access. 
 In a similar vein, phonological distinctions can be objectified based on brain 
correlates. Phonetic distinctive features have their correlates in local cortical 
activation in the auditory and motor systems. This addresses questions about the 
nature of phonological representation: Should phoneme features be construed as 
articulatory or as acoustic? In brain terms, they are both as the phonological cir-
cuits appear to link motor and auditory circuits with each other. 
 An intensive debate about the nature of mental computation can be addres-
sed based on the results from the neuroscience of language. Neuronal ensemble 
theory along with empirical neurophysiological evidence supports the existence 
of discrete cortical representations and mechanistic underpinnings for rules of 
grammar. The position once backed by neural network simulations that rules do 
not exist at the neuronal level may be in need of revision. 
 The idea that it takes about half a second to understand a word or sentence 
— counted from the point in time when the last word critical for sentence 
understanding is first unambiguously present in the input — might imply a 
substantial delay in the comprehension process and, as discussed above, one may 
wonder whether such a delay could represent a substantial disadvantage 
biologically. Supportive of rapid, almost instantaneous understanding comes 
from recent neurophysiological studies suggesting latencies of <250 ms of the 
earliest brain correlates of semantic word and sentence understanding and 
syntactic parsing. These neurophysiological results support rapid and parallel 
psycholinguistic models and argue against slow-serial or -cascaded theories as-
suming sequential steps from phonological to syntactic and semantic modules of 
hundreds of milliseconds. Relevant time delays seem to range around 10–50 ms 
only, thus indicating near-simultaneous activation and information access. 
 Looking back at the review, progress in the where- and when-domain is 
certainly most impressive. In my view, however, the maturity of the field, its 
stage of development, will be evaluated in light of plausible approaches to how 
and why issues. Collecting wisdom about new plants, stars, and brain activation 
loci can advance a field in a hunter-gatherer sense. In order for it to transform 
into an explanatory science, explanations need to be offered (Hempel & Oppen-
heim 1948, von Wright 1971). In the neuroscience of language, these explanations 
use neuroscience facts and established principles of brain structure and function 
as explanans. It is in this explanatory domain where, in my view, further progress 
is most desperately needed. Some little progress has been made, which, however, 
lacks the flashy aspect of newly discovered neurocognitive hotspots. An im-
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portant achievement, now and in the future, may therefore be neuromechanistic 
explanations detailing why specific brain areas are necessary for, or light up and 
index, specific facets of language processing, how neuronal ensembles and distri-
buted areas become activated with precisely timed milli-second delays, and 
which precise neuronal wirings can potentially account for neurometabolic acti-
vation of specific cortical clusters in semantic understanding. 
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